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Tax Treaties and Developing Countries 
 
Eric M. Zolt, UCLA School of Law* 
 
There has been a steady drumbeat by academics and others over the last 50 or more years 
that developing countries should refrain from entering into bilateral tax treaties with 
developed countries because the terms of these tax treaties favor developed countries at 
the expense of developing countries.1 To be sure, developing countries face tough 
choices about whether to enter into tax treaties with developed countries. Several benefits 
flow from entering into tax treaties, including potentially increasing foreign direct and 
portfolio investments from reducing double taxation, creating greater tax certainty for 
investors, and providing for dispute resolution mechanisms for tax controversies. But 
there are real costs of entering into tax treaties. Treaty provisions invariably result in 
developing countries yielding taxing rights with respect to economic activity taking place 
in their country. 
 
This article takes a more nuanced, and perhaps contrary, view about the desirability of tax 
treaties between developed and developing countries. I offer four observations: 
                                                 
* This draft is a revised and expanded version of Tax Treaties and Developing Countries: A Better Deal 
Post-BEPS?, in Tax Treaties and the BEPS Project: A Tribute to Jacques Sasseville (Canadian Tax 
Foundation 2018). I thank Brian Arnold, Hugh Ault, Peter Barnes, Jason Oh, Jacques Sasseville, and Scott 
Wilkie for their helpful comments and suggestions. They are responsible for any errors or omissions. 
1 In 1967, a United Nations Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing 
Countries began their review of the provisions on the OECD Model Treaty that limited the ability of 
developing countries to collect tax revenue. Stanley S. Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the 
Guidelines for Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1978). 
For more recent critiques of the desirability of tax treaties between developed and developing countries, see 
Charles R. Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23:2 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 292 (1974); Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, 32 NYU J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000); 
Michael J. McIntyre, Developing Countries and International Cooperation on Income Tax Matters: An 
Historical Review (2005) (unpublished manuscript) 
(www.michielse.com/files/mcintyre_intl_cooperation.pdf); Lee Sheppard, How Can Vulnerable Countries 
Cope with Tax Avoidance, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 410 (2013); Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling 
Role of Tax Treaties, in TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE, SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, ch. 6 
(Geerten  M. M. Michielse & Victor Thuronyi, eds., 2015); TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: 
BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (2018);  
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1. The conventional wisdom rests on a questionable narrative. It assumes that tax 
treaties result in a transfer of tax revenues from poor countries to rich countries. 
Existing treaty provisions arguably do allocate greater taxing rights to the country 
where the investor resides (generally, capital-exporting developed countries) and 
less taxing rights to the country where the income is earned (capital-importing 
developing countries). But transfers of taxing rights are not the same as transfers 
of tax revenues. For a variety of reasons, tax revenue yielded by developing 
countries likely results in relatively little revenue gains by developed countries. 
The second treaty myth is that in the current economic environment, tax treaties 
are less about distributive rules between countries and more about developed 
countries assisting their multinational entities (MNEs) in reducing their foreign 
tax liabilities;2 
 
2. In determining the desirability of tax treaties, it may be more useful to view 
treaties as partly or largely tax incentives rather than agreements on how to divide 
tax revenue among countries with competing claims. Thus viewed, tax treaties are 
more tools to influence economic decisions regarding cross-border investments 
and less formal rules for allocating taxing rights; 
 
3. Treating developing countries as a single group fails to appreciate the great 
diversity among countries that fall within the category of “developing countries.” 
Without a better understanding of the particular economic objectives and 
characteristics, political choices, and administrative capabilities of individual 
countries, general conclusions about the desirability of tax treaties are of limited 
use; and 
 
4. Assessing the desirability of tax treaties between developing and developed 
countries requires the hard work of making difficult country-specific and treaty-
                                                 
2 The first treaty myth is that tax treaties are essential to reduce or eliminate double taxation. Dagan, The 
Tax Treaty Myth, supra note 1. 
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specific determinations about costs and benefits associated with tax treaties 
(which in turn requires making assumptions about investment flows and tax 
revenue in a world with and without tax treaties).  
 
Part I examines why tax treaties with developed countries may be a bad deal for 
developing countries and reviews the treaty provisions that are most problematic in terms 
of lost revenue. It then examines why the tax revenue losses by developing countries may 
not result in revenue gains by developed countries. 
 
Part II examines the costs and benefits to developing countries from entering into tax 
treaties. It starts with a simple thought experiment: How would the level of foreign 
investment and the amount of tax revenue change if treaties between developed and 
developing countries adopted a source-friendly, pro-developing country standard for 
taxing business activity (for example, a significant economic presence test such as in-
country revenues greater than $10 million)?   
 
This part then reviews what policymakers would need to know in order to estimate the 
costs and benefits associated with entering into a treaty with a developed country. It notes 
that the existing economic studies examining the relationship of tax treaties and levels of 
foreign investments are of limited usefulness in making these determinations. This 
exercise also highlights the folly of offering blanket conclusions about the desirability of 
tax treaties between developed and developing countries. The relative costs and benefits 
for a particular developing country will vary by treaty partner. Similarly, economic, 
political, and administrative differences among developing countries will likely result in 
different conclusions about the desirability of tax treaties.    
 
Part III reviews how the OECD’s BEPS project and the reforms that may result from these 
efforts may change the calculus about whether developing countries should enter into tax 
treaties with developed countries. It then offers some observations about factors that may 
influence the desirability of treaties going forward.  
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Part IV concludes that while tax treaties with developed countries may be a poor decision 
for some developing countries, other developing countries may find tax treaties with 
developed countries in their economic interests. 
 
 
I. Why Bilateral Tax Treaties are a Bad Deal for Developing Countries 
 
A. The case against tax treaties 
 
Jurisdiction to tax can be assigned to the taxpayer’s country of residence (residence-based 
taxation), to the country where the income is earned (source-based taxation), or both 
countries can be allowed to tax. Bilateral tax treaties allocate taxing rights between 
countries based on such factors as the type of income and the nature in which the 
business is conducted in the country. Generally, countries can tax the active business 
income of a resident of a treaty partner only if the activities meet a threshold requirement 
generally tied to having a permanent establishment in the country.3 
 
Several academics and policy advisers contend that developing countries should hesitate 
before entering into tax treaties with developed countries.4 The case against tax treaties 
between developed and developing countries comes in three parts: (1) doubts about the 
general utility of tax treaties; (2) a belief that the lost revenue from yielding taxing rights 
exceeds the benefits of the treaties (the “poisoned chalice” effect);5 and (3) concerns that 
tax treaties facilitate aggressive tax-avoidance strategies by MNEs and other taxpayers. 
 
1. General Utility of Tax Treaties  
 
                                                 
3 Brian J. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits under Tax Treaties, in THE 
TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES (Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville & Eric M. 
Zolt, eds., 2004); Adolfo Martín Jimenéz, Preventing Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, in 
UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, ch. 7 (2d ed. 2017). 
4 Irish, supra note 1; McIntyre, supra note 1; Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, supra note 1; IMF, Spillovers in 
International Corporate Taxation, 28–29 (IMF Policy Paper, 2014).   
5 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1 at 160. 
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Why bother with tax treaties? When does it make sense for countries to yield voluntary 
taxing rights with respect to economic activity in their country? The first step in 
addressing these questions is to identify the objectives for entering into tax treaties and to 
determine how countries can best achieve these objectives. Not surprisingly, countries 
can differ from one another, both in the importance that they assign to different 
objectives and in their notions of how to address them. Three common objectives of 
bilateral tax treaties are to reduce double taxation, to prevent tax evasion and avoidance, 
and to further economic policy.6 Other non-tax objectives include the role tax treaties 
play in furthering diplomatic relations, including development assistance from treaty 
partners.7  
 
Double taxation. Tax treaties have long been sold as a means to reduce double taxation.8 
For countries to realize the benefits from cross-border activity, they need to ensure the 
total taxes imposed (by them and other countries) are not so high as to make engaging in 
these activities economically unattractive. If two countries have the right to tax an 
activity or investment, and each imposes tax at a significant tax rate (say 35% tax rate), 
then the very high pre-tax rate of return required for an investment to be economically 
viable will result in relatively little cross-border activity. The primary task for the original 
designers of the international tax framework was to design a system to reduce the 
aggregate tax liability and to allocate taxing rights to different countries depending on the 
nature of activity and types of investment. The fundamental treaty structure adopted by 
the League of Nations in 1928 allocated the corporate-level tax to the country where the 
business was conducted and the personal-level tax on dividends to the country where the 
recipients resided.9 
 
                                                 
6 Treaties also play an important role in preventing certain forms of tax discrimination. 
7 See Julia Braun & Martin Zagler, The True Art of the Tax Deal: Evidence on Aid Flows and Bilateral 
Double Tax Agreements, (Ctr. For Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 17-011, 2017) for a study 
that finds, on average, developing countries which enter into treaties with developed countries receive an 
additional 22% in official development assistance (roughly $6 million) in the year the treaty is signed. 
8 DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 1, at 73-80.  
9 John Avery Jones, Are Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1 (1999); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. 
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of US International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021 (1997). 
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To the extent that double taxation is undesirable, countries can reduce or eliminate many 
of the instances of double taxation through unilateral action rather than entering into 
treaties.10 Countries have long yielded taxing rights by allowing foreign tax credits (the 
US adopted a foreign tax credit in 1918) or exemptions through their domestic tax 
legislation without resorting to treaty provisions.11 As more countries adopt exemption 
systems for active business income (or allowed for substantial or permanent deferral 
under the vintage US-style tax regimes), the potential for double taxation is likely much 
less now than it was 10 or 20 years ago.  
 
In an influential article, Professor Tsilly Dagan nicely demonstrates that countries left to 
their own devices will conclude that it makes economic sense for them to adopt measures 
to provide tax relief for foreign taxes paid by their residents (either through a foreign tax 
credit, deduction, or exemption) -- even without reciprocation by other countries.12 
Dagan uses a game-theoretic approach to show that countries acting in their own self-
interest will adopt unilateral measures to avoid or reduce double taxation—thus making 
treaties unnecessary for these purposes. Dagan’s approach assumes that revenues lost by 
one country (for example, the source country) are completely picked up by the other 
country (the country of residence).13  If this assumption holds, treaties that provide for 
source countries (generally developing countries) to yield taxing rights will result in 
greater revenues for residence countries (generally developed countries). 14 Under this 
scenario, treaties will not reduce the aggregate level of tax liability below what it would 
have been in a world of unilateral action, thus resulting in no increase in the level of 
foreign investment. Developing countries give up potential tax revenues but get no 
additional investment. In other words, developing countries get nothing for something. 
 
                                                 
10 Elizabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 
RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 430 (1963); Alex A. Easson, Do We Still Need Tax Treaties?, 54 BULL. FOR INT’L 
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 619 (2000); and Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, supra note 1 at 939. 
11 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 9. 
12 Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, supra note 1. 
13 Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, supra note 1, at 40-41,46-47, and 51-52. 
14 See discussion accompanying footnotes 50 to 57 for the economic consequences if the assumption of full 
transferability of tax revenues does not apply. 
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While countries can unilaterally eliminate most forms of source-residence double 
taxation,15 the potential for double taxation still exists with respect to the source of 
income and residence status. Countries have different rules for determining the source of 
income for domestic tax purposes and for determining residence status. This is not 
surprising given the lack of any theoretical coherence in determining where different 
types of income are sourced and the remarkable electivity of residence by taxpayers.16 
Here, tax treaties are necessary to provide for consistent rules to prevent potential double 
taxation. 
 
Assistance in tax enforcement. Taxpayers are global, but tax authorities are local. Treaties 
not only provide a mechanism for local tax authorities to obtain information from other 
countries about taxpayers who do business in their country, but also about domestic 
taxpayers who have investments and activities in other countries. Historically, the 
information exchange mechanism proved to be of little use to developing countries 
because of challenges with respect to the process for obtaining the information, as well as 
the existence of bank secrecy laws that shielded access to the information.17 However, 
with the transition from exchange of information on request to automatic exchange of 
information through a common reporting standard, the game has changed. Assuming 
developing countries can satisfy privacy and data protection obligations, access to 
information from other countries will be an important tool in improving compliance and 
reducing tax evasion. 
 
Treaties also provide for administrative cooperation in tax collection between countries 
(including allowing the enforcement of tax judgments in the treaty partner’s courts) and 
for a mechanism for resolving disputes among taxpayers and the treaty countries. While 
countries can either adopt domestic measures or seek arrangements with other countries 
                                                 
15 Differences in source rules and in characterization of income make it difficult for domestic tax law to 
completely eliminate source-residence double taxation. Here, treaties play an important role in 
supplementing domestic rules on relief of double taxation. 
16 Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and 
Unsatisfactory Policy, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1357, 1417–26 (2001); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31–48 (2014).  
17 For a review of some of the challenges facing developing countries in obtaining information, see Michael 
McIntyre, How to End of the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 695 (2009). 
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for information exchanges or dispute resolution without entering into bilateral tax 
treaties, a tax treaty between two countries facilitates the adoption of automatic 
exchanges of information agreements and dispute resolution procedures. For countries 
that prefer the treaty route to gain administrative assistance, a “skinny” tax treaty that 
covers only information exchanges, dispute resolution, and transfer-pricing guidelines 
may achieve many of the benefits of tax treaties without yielding taxing rights.18 
 
Instrument to further economic objectives. Both developed and developing countries use 
tax treaties to create a tax environment that encourages foreign direct and portfolio 
investment. Countries compete for jobs, capital investment, the location of intangible 
property (such as patents and other forms of intellectual property), to develop natural 
resources, and to serve as global or regional hubs for corporate headquarters, research 
and development, and the provision of financial services.19 While scholars differ about 
whether treaties are effective in achieving these objectives, this remains the primary 
reason developing countries enter into tax treaties.  
 
While many factors influence decisions about where to invest (such as quality of 
infrastructure, political stability, labor productivity, rule of law, and levels of corruption), 
taxes play an important role. Treaty supporters highlight the important role treaties play 
in creating an “investor-friendly” tax environment and in signaling that a country 
welcomes foreign investment.20 One of the major benefits from treaties is providing a 
degree of certainty and predictability for foreign investors in estimating projected tax 
liability for potential investments in a country. Treaty provisions shape the basic 
framework for taxing potential investments, and the impact of domestic tax law, while 
still important, is constrained with a treaty in place. Greater predictability of tax liabilities 
exists for investments in treaty countries because changes in the terms of tax treaties are 
                                                 
18 Victor Thuronyi, Tax Treaties and Developing Countries, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES 
BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 441, 445 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010). 
19 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 262 (2016). 
20 Michael Lang & Jeffrey Owens, The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development and Protecting the 
Tax Base 4 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398438. 
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less frequent than changes in domestic tax legislation.21 Foreign investors also value the 
role of treaties in potentially minimizing disputes with tax authorities, as well as 
providing a mechanism for dispute resolution. 
 
Tax treaties may have a greater impact on the level of foreign investment in countries 
with a history of political and economic instability, where foreign investors perceive that 
the tax regime deviates from global norms (or might in the future), and where challenges 
exist in dealing with the tax authorities with respect to compliance and resolving tax 
controversies (for corruption or other reasons).  In choosing where to invest, foreign 
investors are likely to place less value on the existence of a tax treaty with Singapore than 
they would with some other countries in the region. Even without a treaty, investors in 
Singapore benefit from a stable tax environment and a good mechanism for dispute 
resolution. In other countries, treaties would add more value to creating an investor-
friendly tax environment. But even here, countries do not need treaties to improve the tax 
environment for foreign investment. In many developing countries, much can be done to 
improve domestic tax legislation and tax administration to provide a more effective tax 
system for all investors, not just those from treaty countries. 
 
In deciding whether a country should use domestic legislation or tax treaties to establish 
rules for cross-border taxation (including rules that define the country’s tax jurisdiction), 
it is important to consider process issues. Several factors weigh in favor of domestic 
legislation. These include the greater flexibility to amend or repeal rules that prove to be 
disadvantageous, the greater transparency for the public and legislators of rules and 
concessions that are made through the domestic legislative process rather than through 
treaty negotiations,22 and the greater coverage afforded by a regime that applies to all 
foreign investors, not just those from treaty countries.23  
 
                                                 
21 For some countries (such as the US), later changes in domestic tax law can override existing tax treaties. 
But for many other countries treaties prevail over subsequent changes in domestic law. 
22 This difference depends on whether the domestic rules governing ratifying treaties provide for similar 
levels of transparency as compared to domestic tax legislation. 
23 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1. 
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However, exclusive use of domestic legislation prevents countries from providing 
favorable provisions selectively, through tax treaties, rather than universally, through 
domestic tax legislation. Tax treaties allow countries the flexibility to discriminate among 
countries and provide favorable treatment when the benefits justify yielding tax revenue. 
Finally, while countries can adopt unilateral measures to achieve many treaty objectives, 
the lack of a treaty deprives their residents of reciprocal benefits.24 
 
In sum, strong arguments exist that countries do not need tax treaties to avoid double 
taxation resulting from most source-residence conflicts (treaties are still necessary to 
resolve disagreements between countries related to different rules for determining the 
source of income or for residence status). Treaties do play an important role in assistance 
in collecting taxes, dispute resolution, and information exchanges (particularly if 
countries can take advantage of automatic information exchanges), but opportunities exist 
for countries to achieve these objectives without entering into bilateral tax treaties. While 
treaties contribute to improving the tax environment for foreign investment, the questions 
remain by how much and at what cost. Part II attempts to provide some answers. 
 
2. Poisoned Chalice 
 
For many observers, the price of admission to the tax treaty club is too steep for 
developing countries. Developed countries designed the original rules and generally 
controlled the process for changing them when it was in their interest.25 Because of 
differences in bargaining power and the lack of experience in negotiating treaties, 
developing countries often faced a “take it or leave it” proposition. If developing 
                                                 
24 For example, Singapore is quite successful in making their country attractive to US investors through 
unilateral action. But because there is no US-Singapore tax treaty, Singapore investors in the US bear high 
withholding taxes and other penalties. 
25 As an African tax official stated in a UN tax subcommittee meeting, “If you are not at the table, you are 
on the menu,” repeating a remark that is thought to have originated in Washington around twenty years 
ago, and recently used by U.S. Senator Patty Murray with respect to the all-male 13-member Republican 
working group to reform the Affordable Care Act. Patty Murray, If You’re Not at the Table, You’re on the 
Menu, MEDIUM (May 23, 2017), https://medium.com/@PattyMurray/if-youre-not-at-the-table-you-re-on-
the-menu-932c0f76550a. Developing countries have been unsuccessful in their efforts to establish an 
intergovernmental UN tax body to represent developing countries in reforming the international tax regime. 
Stephanie Soong Johnston, UN Rejects Global Tax Body, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 195 (2015). 
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countries wanted to conclude treaties with developed countries (and the purported 
additional foreign investment that would follow), they accepted terms that required them 
to forego taxing economic activity in their country. 
 
Tax treaties are nominally reciprocal. If capital flows are roughly equal between the 
countries, rules that skew taxing rights towards residence-based taxation, away from 
source-based taxation, will result in little shifting of tax revenue between the countries. 
There is rough justice here; what a country loses on the source side is made up on the 
residence side. If residence countries are better able to collect taxes on their resident 
taxpayers than source countries, then allocation of greater rights to residence countries 
will make both countries better off. 
  
If capital flows are less even, the revenue consequences may be substantial.26 The 
existing treaty provisions generally result in greater tax revenues for residence countries 
(generally, capital-exporting developed countries) and less tax revenues for source 
countries (capital-importing developing countries). Thus, as developing countries enter 
into more treaties with developed countries, the greater the negative revenue 
consequences. 
 
Professors Kim Brooks and Rick Krever forcefully argue that tax treaties are a “poisoned 
chalice” for developing countries, as tax revenues shift from developing to developed 
countries with little or no offsetting benefits to developing countries (such as increased 
levels of foreign investment).27 To achieve a more equitable global tax system, they call 
for developing countries to refrain from entering into new tax treaties with developed 
countries.28 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth supra note 1; Brooks & Krever, supra note 1; Victor Thuronyi, 
supra note 18; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS (2009). 
27 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1 at 160. Brooks and Krever recognize that tax treaties also shift tax 
revenue from developing countries to foreign investors, but they do not consider the consequences of such 
transfer. Id. 
28 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1 at 178. 
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While it is clear that developing countries yield taxing rights to developed countries by 
entering into tax treaties, it is less clear where the revenue goes. One alternative, put forth 
by such scholars as Dagan, Brooks, and Krever,29 finds the revenue is transferred to 
developed countries with little or no economic benefits to developing countries. It is a 
zero-sum game, with a full transfer of tax revenues, such that one country’s gain is 
another country’s loss. A second alternative, examined further in Section II.B, Tax 
Treaties as Tax Incentives, posits the lost revenue is partly or largely picked up by 
foreign investors (through lower aggregate tax liability). This can result if the foreign 
investors’ home country has an exemption system for active business income,30 if world-
wide tax systems allow for substantial deferral opportunities, or from tax minimization 
strategies (including using affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions to receive dividends, interest, 
and royalties from activities in developing countries). MNEs have long been successful in 
shifting income earned in either developed or developing countries to low- or no-tax 
jurisdictions as “homeless” or “stateless” income to avoid both source- and residence-
based taxation.31 In some instances, residence countries have been complicit in these 
efforts by facilitating avoidance of source-based taxation to assist their MNEs in 
minimizing their foreign tax liability (which also has the favorable result of, in some 
countries, reducing the amount of foreign tax credits that can be credited against domestic 
taxes).32  
 
Under the second alternative, the focus on the transfer of tax revenues from developing 
countries to developed countries is misplaced. To see why, it may be helpful to 
distinguish between three types of foreign investments in a developing country: (1) 
existing foreign investments in the country; (2) new foreign investments that would have 
                                                 
29 Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, supra note 1; DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 1; and 
Brooks & Krever, supra note 1. 
30 Foreign investors’ ability to capture the full benefit will be limited if the exemption system requires the 
foreign active business income to be subject to a minimum tax rate. 
31 Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at Source is the 
Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 
(2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income’s Challenge to Tax Policy, 68 TAX NOTES INT’L 499 
(2012). 
32 Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race to the 
Bottom, 41 TAX NOTES INT’L, 459 (2006). 
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been made even without a treaty (“non-treaty related investments”); and (3) new foreign 
investments that result from treaty adoption (“treaty-related investments”). New tax 
treaties have both infra-marginal and marginal effects. The infra-marginal effects of a 
new treaty for existing investments and non-treaty-related investments are as follows: 
foreign investors receive treaty benefits and pay less taxes to the developing country, but 
there is no marginal increase in investment due to the treaty. Whether the economic 
benefits from the developing country yielding taxing rights accrues to the foreign investor 
or the developed country does not affect either the level of investment or the developing 
country’s tax revenues. 
 
The marginal effects from tax treaties focus on treaty-related investments. Developing 
countries face this cost-benefit trade-off: are the economic benefits from this additional 
marginal investment (including any additional tax revenue attributable to the incremental 
investment by the investor or any spillover effects) greater than the lost revenue from 
treaty benefits granted to old investments and non-treaty related investments? For these 
purposes, no revenue losses result from the treaty-related investments to the developing 
country because without the treaty, there would be no investment, and therefore no 
revenue. Here, the relative allocation of treaty benefits between the foreign investor and 
the developed country matters, but only with respect to the economic effect of the tax 
subsidies on increasing marginal investment. The greater the share to the foreign investor, 
the greater incentive to invest in the developing country.33  
 
Under this second alternative, whether developing countries should enter into tax treaties 
with developed countries depends on the relative costs from lost revenues and the 
expected economic benefits from entering into the treaty. Unlike the first alternative, this 
                                                 
33 An example may be helpful. Assume a developing country has $100 million of existing investment, $50 
million of new investment that would have been made even without a treaty, and $50 million of new 
investment that results from treaty adoption and that the investments generate a 10% return and the 
earnings are distributed as dividends to the parent company. If a developing country enters into a treaty and 
reduces the withholding rate on dividends from 15% to 5%, the existing investment and the non-treaty 
related investments get a windfall and the developing country losses $1.5 million in tax revenue ($15 
million of dividends and a 10% tax reduction), assuming the level of dividends remain the same pre-and 
post-treaty. If the level of dividends increases, then the revenue loss would be reduced. Whether a treaty 
with a developed country makes economic sense depends on whether the economic benefits from the treaty 
exceeds the lost revenue attribute to lower withholding rates on dividends and other treaty benefits.  
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requires a country-specific and treaty-specific determination of the economic 
consequences to decide whether tax treaties are a good or bad deal. 
 
3. Facilitating Tax Avoidance   
 
The discussion of the desirability of tax treaties between developing and developed 
countries has focused primarily on developing countries’ yielding of taxing rights to 
treaty partners. Concerns also exist, however, that the tax treaty networks of developing 
countries are subject to abuses that generate significant revenue losses to developing 
countries.34 Although countries agree to yield taxing rights with respect to investors from 
their treaty partner, they may not have bargained on other investors taking advantage of 
the tax benefits.35 These tax losses can result from foreign investors’ routing investment 
through the treaty country or from local investors’ “round tripping” investment through 
the treaty country to obtain tax benefits not available under domestic law.  
 
For most developing countries, a low-tax jurisdiction (often a tax haven) serves as the 
entry point for investment into the country—with favorable tax treatment resulting from 
favorable tax treaties between the developing country and the low-tax jurisdiction. 
Whether these tax havens are beneficial to developing countries again depends on the 
tradeoff between greater foreign investment and lost tax revenue. For those who contend 
that tax havens allow developing countries to adopt, indirectly, favorable tax rules for 
foreign investors while maintaining more robust tax regimes for domestic investors, tax 
havens play an important role in achieving this differentiation.36 Indeed, as discussed 
later, a similar argument can be made with respect to tax treaties writ large – the 
existence of a treaty network allows countries to provide different tax regimes for foreign 
and domestic investors without having to provide explicitly favorable provisions in their 
tax legislation. Perhaps a less appreciated advantage is that developing countries can use 
                                                 
34 Graeme S. Cooper, Preventing Tax Treaty Abuse, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES 
IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 6 (2d ed. 2017). 
35 In some instances, developing countries may have intended to allow treaty-shopping opportunities as a 
way to provide indirect tax incentives to increase foreign investment. 
36 Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax Havens, 24 OXFORD REV. 
OF ECON. POL’Y 661 (2008). 
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treaties with tax havens to assist some foreign investors in minimizing their tax liability 
in their residence country.  
 
According to those who contend that tax havens are evil and parasitic, strong arguments 
exist for reconsidering the desirability of tax treaties between developing countries and 
tax havens.37 The combination of relatively low tax revenues collected from business 
activities (whether because of tax incentives, aggressive tax strategies, or tax 
administration challenges), treaty withholding rates of zero on dividends, interest, and 
royalties, and ineffective measures to prevent treaty shopping, is a recipe for minimizing 
tax revenues for developing countries. To prevent foreign investors from claiming 
benefits to shift profits out of the country, several countries have recently terminated or 
renegotiated tax treaties with tax havens.38 As discussed later, developing countries can 
use higher withholding tax rates, limitation of benefits clauses, or other anti-abuse 
provisions to address revenue losses from investments through tax havens. 
 
  
B.  Which Treaty Provisions Are Most Problematic? 
 
The starting point of determining the potential costs of entering into tax treaties is the 
allocation of taxing rights under bilateral tax treaties. One reading of the allocation rules 
is that they reflect a historical compromise among the original participating countries, 
which held competing views on the relative merits of source- and residence-based 
taxation.39 Whatever the initial logic for the allocation, these rules remained in place 
                                                 
37 Joel Slemrod & John Wilson, Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens, 93 J. OF PUB. ECON. 1261 
(2009). 
38 Martin Hearson, When Do Developing Countries Negotiate Away Their Corporate Tax Base, 30 J. OF 
INT’L DEV 233 (2018) (Argentina, Malawi, Mongolia, Rwanda, and Zambia have terminated or 
renegotiated tax treaties)(“Corporate Tax Base”); Martin Hearson, TAX TREATIES IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA: A CRITICAL REVIEW (Tax Justice Network) (2015), 
https://martinhearson.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/tjna_treaties.pdf.  In 2012, Mongolia cancelled its tax 
treaty with several countries, including the Netherlands, because the zero or low withholding rates on 
dividends, interest, and royalties allowed MNEs engaged in the mining sector to shift profits out of the 
country with little or no tax liability. IMF, Mongolia: Technical Assistance Report – Safeguarding Domestic 
Revenue – A Mongolian DTA Model, IMF Country Report No. 12/306 (2012).   
39 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 9. 
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through changes in the political and economic landscape and through dramatic increases 
in the number of countries entering into tax treaties. A less charitable view is that 
developed countries controlled the decision-making process and preferred rules that 
benefited capital-exporting countries. Both historically and recently, efforts to change the 
basic allocation of taxing rights have been largely unsuccessful. 
 
Three types of limitations on source-country taxation result in substantial revenue losses 
for developing countries.40  First, treaties establish taxing rights for active business 
income by requiring a certain threshold of activity before the source country can tax 
profits earned in that country. The permanent establishment (PE) concept plays a central 
role in fixing tax jurisdiction. The existence of a PE is required before a source country 
can tax the business income derived by a resident of the treaty partner. High thresholds 
favor capital-exporting countries and low thresholds favor capital-importing countries. 
Second, treaties limit the rates of withholding taxes that countries can impose on certain 
types of income earned in the country, such as interest, dividends, and royalties, as well 
as income earned for management, technical and consulting services. These limited 
withholding rates are often lower than the withholding rates provided under domestic 
law. Finally, treaties allocate the exclusive right to tax certain types of income to the 
residence country, including pensions, social security payments, service income related to 
infrastructure projects, and capital gains (except for real estate).41 Restrictions on taxing 
capital gains on shares of domestic corporations held by foreign investors are problematic 
from the perspective of a developing country.42   
 
                                                 
40 Treaties also bring developing countries into or closer to the OECD’s orbit for transfer pricing regimes, 
separate accounting for related corporations, and rules regarding attribution of income to a PE. Even where 
developing countries have taxing rights under the treaty, these elements limit the amount of tax revenue 
developing countries can collect from business activity in their country. But even without treaties, the 
domestic laws of many developing countries generally follow the OECD provisions. 
41 Developing countries are the beneficiaries of treaty provisions that allocate the rights to tax artists and 
athletes and government pensions to source countries.  
42 Wei Cui, Taxing Indirect Transfers: Improving an Instrument for Stemming Tax and Legal Base Erosion, 
33 VA. TAX REV. 653 (2014).  
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For over 50 years, the United Nations (UN) has, through the efforts of ad hoc working 
groups of tax officials and tax experts, worked to formulate guidelines for tax treaties 
between developed and developing countries. 43 The UN published the first Manual for the 
Negotiation of Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries in 1979, and 
in 1980, it developed the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries. Detailed reviews of the differences between the 
OECD and the UN Model Tax Conventions are available from several sources.44  
 
The key differences between the OECD and UN model conventions center on the same 
three limitations discussed above: the threshold for taxing business income, limitations on 
withholding taxes, and limitations on the rights to tax certain types of income.45 The UN 
objective was to increase source-based taxation of business income by lowering the 
threshold for source-country taxation under tax treaties. Over the years, the UN has 
expanded the definition of “permanent establishment” under Article 5 of the UN model 
convention to include more activities than are found in the OECD provisions (such as 
services PEs, construction sites, and insurance) and to limit some of the exceptions for PE 
status (by treating delivery and maintenance of a stock of goods as sufficient activity for 
an economic nexus).  
 
The UN model convention also provides for greater source-based taxation for dividends, 
interest, and royalties, not only by providing countries with greater flexibility in setting 
withholding rates (especially a positive rate on royalty income), but also by expanding 
the scope of royalties to include rent for industrial, commercial, and scientific 
equipment.46 Finally, the UN model convention provides greater opportunities for source-
country taxation of certain types of income (including income from international shipping 
                                                 
43 Surrey, supra note 1. An excellent review of the history of the UN efforts to provide a forum for developing 
countries is set forth in McIntyre, supra note 1. 
44 See, e.g., Michael Lennard, The UN Model Tax Convention as Compared with the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, 49 ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULL. 4 (2009); Avi-Yonah, supra note 24. See, also, Carrie Elliot, The 
Convergence of U.N. and OECD Global Tax Policy, 90 TAX NOTES INT’L 200 (2018). 
45 Other differences relate to shipping, insurance, and the treatment of payments to top-level managerial 
officials. 
46 While providing greater flexibility for choice of withholding rates has some advantages, developing 
countries may be better served if the UN model convention provided suggested withholding rates for these 
types of income that could serve as a baseline for treaty negotiation. 
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and payments to top-level managers), as well as for source-country taxation of capital 
gains of non-residents from the disposition of substantial interests in resident companies. 
 
To determine the influence of the UN model convention on treaty negotiations, scholars 
from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) reviewed treaties of many 
developed and developing countries to determine whether treaties contained UN-specific 
treaty provisions.47 The most recent IBFD study, completed in March 2014, reviewed 
about 1800 treaties that were concluded between April 1, 1997 and January 2013 to see 
whether they contained any of the 30 UN-specific provisions. The findings of the 2014 
IBFD study paint an interesting picture of the influence of the UN model convention on 
actual treaty practice. The UN model convention has clearly influenced treaty practice 
between non-OECD countries as well as between non-OECD and OECD countries.48 
 
But two factors limit the impact of the UN model convention. First, for many UN 
provisions, the adoption rates are remarkably low. The IBFD study found for 21 of the 30 
UN provisions, the adoption rate was lower than 40 percent and for 12 of the UN 
provisions, the rate was lower than 20 percent.49 Second, as long as the UN convention 
retains the basic architecture of the OECD model, revenue gains to developing companies 
will be limited. Without major changes to transfer pricing regimes, separate treatment of 
related corporations, and the PE standard, adopting UN treaty provisions in treaties with 
developing countries will increase tax revenues, but likely not dramatically. 
 
 
                                                 
47 W.F.G. Wijnen & Marco Magenta, The UN Model in Practice, 51 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 574 (1997) (the “1997 study”); W.F.G. Wijnen et al., The Treatment of Services in Tax 
Treaties, 66 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 27 (2011) (the “2011 study”); W.J.G. Wijnen and J. de Goede, The UN 
Model in Practice 1997–2013, 68 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 118 (2014) (the “2014 study”). The 1997 study 
reviewed 811 treaties entered into between January 1980 and April 1997 to see which treaties contained 26 
UN-specific provisions. The 2011 study examined 1,586 treaties entered into between April 1, 1997 and 
June 2011 to see whether they contained 16 UN-specific provisions.  
48 For a thoughtful discussion of why developing countries would conclude treaties with developed 
countries on the basis of the OECD model, see Eduardo Baistroocchi, The Use and Interpretations of Tax 
Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications, BRITISH TAX REVIEW NO. 4 (2008). 
49 Wijnen & Magenta, the 2014 study, supra note 47.  
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C. How much tax revenue is really transferred from developing 
countries to developed countries because of tax treaties? 
 
Although tax treaties result in reduced source-country revenues, residence countries have 
not been particularly interested or successful in capturing a large share of the lost tax 
revenues. Countries have long adopted tax regimes that provide favorable treatment for 
active business income earned outside their country. Exemption systems are the most 
common approach, resulting in so-called territorial taxation, while vintage US-style 
deferral tax systems provide for nominal world-wide taxation but in practice, result in 
substantial tax subsidies for foreign business activity.50 Countries have not adopted 
“pure” exemption or world-wide systems, and, in practice, countries have different types 
of hybrid systems.51 Recent US tax legislation has made this hybrid explicit through the 
move towards a territorial-style exemption system with a world-wide minimum tax on 
excess profits (the tax on global intangible low-tax income or “GILTI” provision).52 
 
The objective of these domestic rules governing out-bound transactions is clear: to make 
home country MNEs competitive in the global economy. But perhaps much less 
appreciated is that in the current tax environment, countries use tax treaties to assist 
resident MNEs in minimizing their tax liability in other countries. Countries can assist 
their MNEs either through the formal treaty process or, less formally, through domestic 
tax provisions that facilitate aggressive tax behavior by their resident MNEs in reducing 
their foreign tax liability (often taking advantage of treaty benefits).53 Stripping away 
                                                 
50 Thornton Matheson, Victoria Perry & Chandara Veung, Territorial v. Worldwide Corporate Taxation: 
Implications for Developing Countries (IMF Working Paper 13/205) (Oct. 3, 2013). Matheson et al. 
highlight that when countries move from a world-wide tax system to a territorial tax system, foreign 
investors are likely to shift income from high-tax to low-tax source countries. See also Li Liu, Country 
Taxation and Multilateral Investment: Evidence from the UK Changes to Territoriality (Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper, 2015). 
51 Rosanne Altshuler, Stephen Shay & Eric Toder, Lessons the United States Can Learn from Other 
Countries’ Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations, (Tax Policy Center, 
2015). 
52 GILTI presumes that excess profits from foreign operations are attributable to intangibles and effectively 
act as a US minimum income for the excess of the normal return attributable to foreign depreciable tangible 
property. See, generally, Lee Sheppard, GILTI as Charged, 90 TAX NOTES 767 (2018). 
53 26 C.F.R. 301.7701-3. For some historical perspective, see Kenan Mullis, Check-the-Box and Hybrids: A 
Second Look at Elective U.S Tax Classification of Foreign Entities, 64 TAX NOTES 371 (2011). 
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source country tax revenue does not necessarily translate into higher tax revenues for 
residence countries. 
 
How much revenue is actually collected by residence countries from foreign source 
income? The answer is probably a relatively low percentage of the residence country’s 
total corporate tax revenue. For countries with exemption systems, only the non-
qualifying income would be subject to tax, and even that income could be shifted to low-
tax jurisdictions or could often be reduced by a credit for foreign taxes paid. For countries 
with a nominal world-wide system (such as the vintage US-style deferral system), the 
answer again is probably not much. To the extent the foreign income is taxed in high-
taxed countries, the foreign tax credits reduce or eliminate US tax liability and, to the 
extent the foreign income is taxed in low-taxed countries, MNEs avoid US tax liability by 
not repatriating the income. Rough approximations of tax revenue from foreign source 
income and the relative amount of foreign income shifted to low-tax jurisdictions are 
available from several sources. One approach uses US Treasury tax data to estimate the 
share of taxes attributable to foreign source income. Using US Treasury tax data for 
2006, Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler found that total tax revenues from foreign-
source income amounted to $32 billion, which represented about 9% of total corporate 
tax revenues and less than 4% of all foreign-source income.54 Other approaches include 
reviewing publicly-available financial statements of large corporations to determine the 
effective tax rates of these firms55 or using Bureau of Economic Analysis survey data on 
                                                 
54 Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the Tax System: An Analysis of Proposals for Reform of 
International Taxation, 6 NAT’L TAX J. 671 (2013). Interestingly, Grubert and Altshuler find that corporate 
tax revenue would actually increase by about $1 billion if the US exempted dividends from foreign taxable 
income. The insight here, is that US MNEs use excess credits from dividends from high-tax countries to 
reduce taxes on royalties and other low-tax active income. 
55 The non-profit Citizens for Tax Justice reviewed the tax information from the 288 Fortune 500 
companies that reported profits in each of five years between 2008 and 2012. As a group, the corporations 
paid an effective tax rate of 19.4%, but what was interesting is the wide variation of effective tax rates 
among these corporations. Twenty-six of the corporations paid no federal income tax over the five-year 
period and about a third paid an effective tax rate of less than 10 percent. Notable among those corporations 
with low effective tax rates is the relatively large share of foreign operations. Robert S. McIntyre, Matthew 
Gardner, and Richard Phillips, The Sorry State of Corporate Taxes: What the Fortune 500 Firms Pay (or 
Don’t Pay) in the USA And What They Pay Abroad—2008 to 2012 (Citizens for Tax Justice, 2014). 
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US MNEs to estimate the amount of corporate tax base erosion due to profit shifting from 
high-tax countries to low-tax countries.56 
 
Why do countries subsidize active foreign business activity with their own and other 
countries’ money? In addition to the political economy explanation that MNEs 
successfully lobby their home countries for favorable tax treatment, here are a few 
reasons. First, for countries with foreign tax credit systems (either for all types of income 
or just for income not qualifying under exemption systems), facilitating lower foreign tax 
liability for home country MNEs means greater tax revenue. Second, to the extent foreign 
business activities complement domestic operations, greater profitability will contribute 
to additional domestic capital investment and employment.57 Third, the reduced tax 
liabilities for MNEs will contribute to higher share prices (increasing tax revenue from 
capital gains on the dispositions of the stock) and higher dividends to shareholders, and 
perhaps higher wages to domestic workers, that will result in more tax revenue at the 
individual-level.  
 
But even without the assistance of their home countries, MNEs have been quite adept in 
shifting profits from both developed and developing countries to low-tax jurisdictions, 
even though little or none of the economic activity takes place in those jurisdictions. As 
set forth in the next section, even if developing countries succeed in getting greater taxing 
rights under treaties, this would not necessarily result in greater tax revenues.  
 
 
II. Costs and Benefits of Entering into Tax Treaties 
  
                                                 
56 Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United States and 
Beyond, 69 NAT’L T. J. 905 (2016) (estimating that US MNEs profit shifting reduced US corporate tax 
revenue for 2012 by between $77-111 billion and that foreign affiliates of US MNEs booked $800 billion 
of income (about 75% of total foreign income) in countries with an effective tax rates of 6.6%); Gabriel 
Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits, 28 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 
121 (Fall 2014) (estimating for the 2013 tax year that 55% of the $2.1 trillion in profits for US MNEs were 
located in tax-haven countries subject to an effective tax rate of 3%).  
57 If foreign business activity substitutes for domestic activity, these subsides will negatively impact 
domestic investment and employment. 
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A. Thought experiment 
 
Here is a thought experiment that might be useful in thinking about the desirability of tax 
treaties between developed and developing countries: 
 
Assume tax treaties between developed and developing countries adopted a 
source-friendly, pro-developing country standard for taxing business activity (for 
example, a substantial economic presence test such as revenues in country greater 
than $10 million).58   
 
Question 1: How would the level of foreign investment into the developing country differ 
from investment levels under the current OECD or UN PE threshold? 
 
Question 2: How much more revenue would the developing country collect compared to 
revenues collected under the current PE thresholds? 
 
Moving to an economic presence threshold may reduce the level of foreign investment, 
but it is difficult to determine the impact without additional information. The initial 
question is how much business activity is currently conducted in the country without a 
PE. For some sectors of the economy (parts of the digital economy and some types of 
services), there may be substantial activity in the country that is currently not subject to 
tax in the country. But for other sectors, it is probably difficult to generate that level of 
revenue without a PE.  
 
The next inquiry is to estimate the amount of lost revenue from business activity where 
the investor has used different strategies to avoid PE status (whether through legitimate 
use of independent agents or more artificial arrangements). Moving to an economic 
presence test has the advantage of taxing business activity where foreign investors are 
                                                 
58 The US threshold for business activity to constitute a US trade or business relies on a substantial, regular 
and continuous test. This would not be a good standard for developing countries because of both the 
administrative challenges in enforcing the standard and the tax uncertainty that foreign investors would 
face in deciding whether to conduct business activities in a particular country. 
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using strategies to artificially avoid PE status, but again, at the margin, may discourage 
some activity. The choice of dollar threshold (for example, $10 million or $50 million in 
revenue) may also influence the level of investment. The minimum amount creates a safe 
harbor to conduct business activity without being subject to tax liability for businesses 
with projected revenues below the threshold, but a source-friendly standard for taxing 
business activity would deter some investment for businesses above the threshold. 
  
The question related to additional revenue from moving to an economic presence test 
raises different types of issues. The first issue is whether as a policy matter, a developing 
country would want to tax the business activity. Countries face challenges in setting the 
tax rates with respect to domestic and foreign investment.59 A strong case can be made 
that developing countries should refrain from taxing income from foreign capital. The 
intuition here is that for small, open economies, the optimal level of tax would be zero.60 
If the supply of foreign direct investment is highly elastic, then any tax would cause 
capital to migrate to other countries until the after-tax return in the taxing country 
increases to the international rate of return. This results in a decline in productivity for 
fixed local factors of production, such that these factors bear the entire tax burden 
(perhaps exceeding one hundred percent of the tax when general equilibrium effects are 
included).61 However, there is a competing argument that countries should impose 
source-based taxes on above-normal returns of location-specific capital. This has even 
greater appeal where the assets generating the above-normal returns are largely owned by 
foreigners. In choosing between and within these prescriptions, countries can design a tax 
regime for foreign investment considering such factors as the proportion of above-normal 
returns that accrue to foreigners, the ability of foreign investors to avoid any sourced-
                                                 
59 Michael Devereux, Investment, Saving, and Taxation in an Open Economy, 12 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. 
POLICY 90 (1996); Margaret K. McKeehan & George R. Zodrow, Balancing Act: Weighing the Factors 
affecting the Taxation of Capital Income in a Small Open Economy, 24 INT’L TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE 1 
(2017). 
60 R.H. Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Savings in the World Economy, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 1086 
(1986). 
61 Arnold C. Harberger, Corporate Tax Incidence: Reflections on What is Known, Unknown, and 
Unknowable, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS (J.W. Diamond & G.R. 
Zodrow eds., 2008). 
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based tax through tax minimizations strategies (with and without the assistance of local 
tax authorities), the domestic challenges from adopting a lower rate of tax on income 
from capital than labor income (domestic taxpayers disguising labor income as income 
from capital), and the extent the imposition of a source-based tax does not increase a 
MNEs’ aggregate tax liability (because the MNE get a foreign tax credit for taxes paid in 
the source country).62  
 
For our purposes, the key insight is that developing countries have several options in 
setting the effective tax rates for foreign investment, including through the general tax 
regime (applicable to both domestic and foreign investors), tax incentives (such as tax 
holidays), lax tax enforcement (ignoring transfer-pricing abuses), and tax treaties. If 
countries want to exempt the normal return from capital income for both domestic and 
foreign investors, then adopting a type of cash-flow tax in the general tax regime will be 
the preferred approach. In contrast, tax treaties provide countries the opportunity to have 
a different tax regime for more mobile investments from foreign investors than the 
regime applicable to less mobile domestic investors. Tax treaties and other types of tax 
incentives allow countries to differentiate without explicitly providing for favorable 
treatment in the tax legislation.  
 
Second, different considerations arise when the focus moves from taxing business profits 
to withholding taxes on interest, dividends, and royalties. Withholding taxes on payments 
made to unrelated parties often acts as a tariff, increasing the costs to residents (and 
perhaps providing the foreign recipient with the benefit of a foreign tax credit). For 
example, increasing withholding taxes on interest under treaties may result in less tax 
revenue for developing countries. Zero or low withholding rates on interest are often 
justified by the mobility of debt financing such that any taxes are likely borne by the 
borrower. To the extent these taxes increase the effective interest rate for domestic 
borrowers (whether or not through interest “gross-up” provisions), the reduction in 
corporate tax revenues from interest deductions will exceed the additional withholding 
taxes by an amount that reflects the difference in the respective tax rates. To the extent 
                                                 
62 McKeehan & Zodrow, supra note 59.  
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taxpayers are using related-party financing to siphon income out of the country, using 
earning stripping or thin capitalization tools to disallow interest at the corporate level is 
likely a more effective strategy than collecting additional withholding tax. But if 
countries seek to impose withholding taxes, one proposal that merits further consideration 
is to adopt a low withholding rate on interest paid to unrelated creditors and a higher 
withholding rate on related-party debt. This approach mimics the US domestic tax 
approach that provides for no withholding on portfolio interest but 30% withholding on 
related-party debt.   
 
The choice of withholding rates for dividends depends in part on how effective countries 
are at taxing profits when earned. If the profits are fully-taxed at the corporate level, then 
the case for high withholding taxes on dividends is greatly weakened. If the profits were 
not taxed or taxed at a low rate (whether because of favorable tax provisions or tax 
incentives, challenges in tax administration, or aggressive tax planning), a dividend 
withholding tax serves as a minimum tax by recapturing some of the tax benefit. For 
example, many developing countries provide favorable tax treatment for foreign investors 
in the extractive sector. Because these investors pay relatively little taxes when the 
income is earned, a withholding tax on dividends is likely the best opportunity for 
developing countries to collect taxes on this activity.63  
 
The strongest case for higher withholding rates is for royalty income and income from 
technical services. Unlike debt capital which can be easily moved to countries that yield 
the highest after-tax rate of return, royalty payments are generally made for use of 
intangible property in a particular jurisdiction.64 Again, it may make sense to differentiate 
between royalty payments made to independent and related parties. Unlike the thin-
capitalization rules for interest payments, transfer-pricing challenges make it difficult to 
limit the siphoning of income to related-parties in low-tax jurisdictions through royalty 
payments. 
                                                 
63 Withholding taxes on dividends may also increase investment in a country by providing disincentives to 
repatriate profits. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1 at 173. 
64 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1 at 172-73. 
26 
 
 
Countries could also consider greater use of withholding taxes for non-passive income.  
The 2017 version of the UN model convention added Article 12A. UN Article 12A 
provides for a source country to impose a withholding tax on gross payments for 
technical services made by a resident (or a non-resident with a PE) to non-resident 
services providers.65 While it is uncertain how successful developing countries will be in 
including Article 12A in treaties with developed and developing countries, this provision 
increases source-based taxation by having a zero dollar threshold on the amount of fees 
subject to withholding and not requiring the service provider to have a PE in the country. 
 
The final consideration is to determine how successful the developing country would be 
in actually taxing the business activity. Although a strong case can be made for providing 
greater taxing rights for source countries in tax treaties (such as replacing the PE standard 
with an economic presence test), it is not clear that including provisions friendly to 
source countries will necessarily translate into substantially greater tax revenue. Two 
areas of potential leakage are the domestic tax regimes (both policy and administration) 
for taxing cross-border income and the use of tax incentives to attract foreign investors.  
 
Foreign investors take advantage of tax treaties to limit their tax liability in source 
countries, but they also use several other tax-minimization strategies to avoid or evade 
source-country taxation. It is likely that many of the common base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) strategies that prompted concerns among developed countries are 
comparatively easy to structure, and they are harder for tax authorities to address in 
developing countries. Merely changing treaty provisions may not increase tax revenues 
unless countries adopt robust rules limiting earnings stripping, transfer-pricing abuses, 
and other tax reduction strategies, 
 
The move from the PE standard to an economic presence test will provide developing 
countries with greater taxing rights for active business income conducted without a PE 
                                                 
65 Brian J. Arnold, Taxation of Income from Services, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES 
IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 2, 108-14 (2d ed. 2017). 
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and certain types of services income. Whether the greater tax rights result in greater tax 
revenues depends on the ability of the developing country to identify and determine the 
business or service income of a foreign investor with little physical presence or activity in 
the country.66 While developing countries may be able to tax certain types of high-profile 
business and service income (such as the activities of Google or Amazon), other types of 
business income and services will escape the attention of local tax authorities. 
 
The interaction of tax treaties and tax incentives has received limited attention, and the 
academic writing has mostly focused on the role of “tax sparing” provisions that seek to 
ensure that the tax benefits awarded by source countries flow to the investor and not to 
the residence country’s tax authorities. In some instances, treaty negotiators from 
developing countries may have placed more emphasis on limiting residence-based 
taxation of income earned in their country than on seeking source-based taxation. My 
focus on the interaction of tax incentives and tax treaties is separate from the tax-sparing 
discussion. First, greater use of tax incentives by developing countries could easily 
undermine the benefits of providing greater source taxation under treaties. Second, tax 
incentives can be a selective or a general substitute for tax treaties insofar as countries 
can achieve a more investor-friendly tax environment by unilaterally granting tax 
incentives rather than entering into tax treaties. 
 
 
B. Tax Treaties as Tax Incentives 
 
There is little disagreement that the distributive provisions of tax treaties work against the 
interests of many developing countries. Developing countries acting collectively through 
the UN or other regional organizations, or individually in their own treaty negotiations, 
have strong incentives to seek more favorable treaty provisions. But while those efforts 
move forward, the question of whether developing countries should move forward with 
tax treaties with developed countries remains. 
 
                                                 
66 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1 at 169-70. 
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One approach to this question is to treat tax treaties as just another type of tax incentive. 
The inquiry then becomes whether tax treaties are the best instrument to achieve a 
country’s economic objectives. This inquiry has two parts: (1) are the economic benefits 
resulting from tax treaties greater than the economic costs; and (2) are treaties the best 
tool to achieve the economic objectives or are other types of tax incentives (such as tax 
holidays, reduced corporate tax rates, and favorable depreciation regimes) or other 
government action more effective? 
 
Viewing tax treaties as partly or largely tax incentives changes the focus from an 
examination of the allocation of taxing rights between countries to a determination of 
how tax treaties fit, if at all, in the country’s strategy to achieve economic objectives. 
This framing also provides an opportunity to profit from developing countries’ 
experience with tax incentives with respect to such issues as how the foreign investor’s 
home country tax system influences the benefits provided by tax incentives and what 
factors and assumptions are important in estimating the costs and benefits from tax 
incentives.  
 
Potential revenue transfer from developing to developed countries. In previous work, I 
addressed how a foreign investor’s home country’s tax system affects the attractiveness 
of developing countries’ tax incentives. 67  I began with a simple model of foreign direct 
investment that assumes the foreign investor invests directly in a developing country, 
either through a branch or through a subsidiary that immediately repatriates any profits to 
the parent corporation. 
Under an exemption system, the tax imposed by the host country for many types of 
income would constitute a final tax on profits earned in that country. Because foreign 
active business income is generally not subject to tax in the investor’s country of 
residence, any tax advantages from tax incentives will flow directly to the foreign 
investor. In contrast, under a “worldwide” tax system, the foreign investor is subject to 
                                                 
67Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries: Maximizing the Benefits and Minimizing the Costs, 
in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, ch. 9 (2d ed. 2017). 
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tax in both the country that was the source of the income and the country of residence of 
the foreign investor. This potential double taxation is generally reduced through the 
resident country providing a credit for foreign income taxes paid on foreign source 
income. But what happens if the foreign investor receives a tax incentive that 
substantially reduces or eliminates the tax in the country of investment? 
The 2000 UNCTAD Survey on Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment 
provides an answer to the question above: 
In order to assess the full tax treatment of FDI [foreign direct investment], it is 
necessary to look into the way home countries tax the income generated in host 
countries. Where an investor is subject to tax under a residence-based principle, the 
introduction of a tax incentive such as a tax holiday reduces or eliminates tax credit in 
the host country. It has the effect of increasing the tax revenues in the home country 
dollar for dollar. For an investor, the total tax burden remains unchanged, negating 
the benefits of tax incentives. Tax incentives simply result in the transfer of tax 
revenues from the host country treasury to the home country treasury. 68 
Tax policy advisors used this view of tax incentives as merely transferring tax revenues 
from poor to rich countries to caution developing countries from adopting tax incentive 
regimes. This shares much in common with the arguments by those who recommend 
that developing countries refrain from entering into treaties with developed countries 
because the tax revenue yielded by the source country is picked up by the residence 
country without any increase in the level of foreign investment. 
                                                 
68 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, SURVEY ON TAX INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT: A GLOBAL SURVEY (2000). Here is a simple example assuming that the corporate 
tax rate in South Africa is 30% and the US corporate tax rate is 35% and that the US corporation invests 
directly in a business in South Africa. If the South African business generates $1 million in profits and 
repatriates the remaining profits to the US, the South African Revenue Service would collect $300,000 in 
taxes and the US Internal Revenue Service would collect $50,000 (the US would impose a 35% tax on the 
foreign income but then allow a foreign tax credit for the $300,000 tax paid to the South African 
Government). If the South African Government provides a tax holiday for this investment in South Africa, 
the South African tax liability would be reduced to zero, but the US tax liability would increase from 
$50,000 to $350,000 (the 35% US tax without any reduction for foreign income taxes paid). While the 
aggregate tax liability of the United States investor remains the same, the South African tax incentive 
results in an effective transfer of $300,000 from the South African Government to the US Government. 
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But how much revenue is really being transferred from developing countries to the 
treasuries of developed countries, and how much foreign investment is being deterred? 
The answer for both traditional tax incentives and for tax treaties is probably very little. 
This is partly because many countries that previously had worldwide tax regimes have 
moved to exemption regimes for active business income. Even if a country still retained 
a nominal worldwide regime (such as the vintage US system which provided for deferral 
for unrepatriated active income), several features of the tax regime make it highly 
unlikely that the income earned outside the country of residence would be subject to 
current (or, in many cases, future) taxation. 
Relatively little foreign investment likely follows the simple model of direct investment 
through a branch or through a subsidiary that immediately repatriates profits to the 
parent corporation. Instead, foreign investors use more complex tax minimization 
strategies, including structuring their investments in developing countries through other 
countries (including tax havens) so as to minimize the potential tax liability associated 
with foreign investments. As the BEPS project highlights, investors use a variety of base-
erosion strategies to move income to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. 
In sum, the tax regimes of developed countries probably have little impact on the 
desirability or effectiveness of tax incentives in developing countries, or on the ability of 
MNEs to capture treaty benefits from developing countries. For MNEs from countries 
allowing foreign tax credits, the potential availability of zero or low-taxed active income 
from foreign sources will be attractive to those tax directors in MNEs who seek to 
minimize the overall worldwide tax liability of the corporation. This results because tax 
directors can effectively “blend” other types of foreign income that are subject to tax 
rates above the tax rate of the country of residence with low-taxed income from 
developing or other countries to reduce the tax liability in the investor’s home country.69 
Interestingly, some current provisions and recent changes to the tax regimes governing 
cross-border transactions of some developed countries may change the conclusion that 
                                                 
69 For example, India and Japan benefit from the ability of US MNEs to bring down the effective tax rates 
in those countries with low-tax income earned elsewhere. Without cross-crediting, effective tax rates for 
investments in India and Japan would be higher. With the US move to quasi-territorial taxation, these 
countries may face greater pressure to reduce their tax rates. 
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developed countries’ tax regimes have little impact on the effectiveness of tax incentives 
and the likelihood that tax treaties result in little revenue transfers from source to 
residence countries. To the extent countries currently have or adopt minimum taxes on 
active foreign business income (whether in a relatively straightforward way through 
including the requirement that foreign income bear a minimum tax rate on a per-country 
basis before qualifying for exception or a more complex approach such as the US GILTI 
provisions), this may result in developing countries foregoing tax incentives and 
imposing taxes at the minimum rate. With respect to tax treaties, taxing rights yielded by 
source countries will result in tax revenue transfers to the residence country at the 
minimum tax rate, thus reducing the value of treaties in attracting foreign investment.  
 
Treating tax treaties as a type of tax incentive encourages countries to consider whether 
treaties are the right tool to attract foreign investment, or whether they might be better off 
using traditional tax incentives such as tax holidays, reduced tax rates, or favorable 
depreciation provisions. While the comparisons of the relative merits of using treaties or 
traditional tax incentives depend heavily of the specifics of the treaty or incentive regime, 
several factors weigh in favor of traditional tax incentives.  For example, policymakers 
are better able to target traditional tax incentives to specific types of projects or investors 
rather than offer tax subsidies to all who qualify for treaty benefits. Traditional tax 
incentives can also be designed to last a limited duration, either for the entire incentive 
regime or for specific investors, while treaties generally have a long, often indefinite time 
horizon. If tax treaties are more effective in attracting new investors rather than 
influencing additional investments by existing investors, then the continued tax benefits 
offered by treaties may yield little additional investment over levels that would have 
occurred without the treaty. Finally, it is likely that traditional tax incentives are easier to 
monitor and evaluate than treaties, especially where the incentive regimes are narrowly 
targeted and where substantial reporting requirement are imposed on the recipients of tax 
subsidies. 
 
Process concerns of the stripe raised by Brooks and Krever in choosing between domestic 
tax legislation and tax treaties to achieve treaty objectives also apply to the choice 
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between tax treaties and traditional tax incentives.70 To the extent traditional tax 
incentives comply with a host of best practices,71 including requiring the tax incentive be 
part of tax legislation voted on by Parliament and vesting the Minister of Finance with 
responsibility to administer the regime, then there may be greater oversight and 
transparency from a traditional tax incentives regime than tax treaties. But where tax 
incentive regimes are less efficient and transparent, and where the potential for abuse is 
substantial, then tax treaties would be the preferred route to provide incentives for foreign 
investment. 
 
 
C. Determining Costs and Benefits of Tax Treaties 
 
1. Introduction and Studies 
 
In assessing the desirability of tax treaties, it may be more useful to focus less on whether 
the treaty provisions are “fair” between developed and developing countries and more on 
whether it makes economic sense for developing countries to enter into the treaties. This 
determination depends on the costs and benefits to the developing country resulting from 
a particular treaty. Some types of costs and benefits are more easily quantified (such as 
estimates of greater levels of foreign investment or lost revenue from reduced 
withholding rates), while other types are harder to value (such as improved diplomatic 
relations with treaty partners).   
 
Many studies have examined whether tax treaties are associated with higher levels of 
foreign investment.72 The intuition is straight-forward: if treaties reduce double taxation, 
provide greater tax certainty to foreign investors, and provide an effective mechanism for 
                                                 
70 Brooks and Krever, supra note 1 and discussion accompanying notes 22 to 24. 
71 See Zolt, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries, supra note 67 at 542-56. 
72 See, e.g., Eric Neumayer, Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Investment to Developing 
Countries?, 43 J. OF DEV. STUD. 1501 (2006); Fabian Barthel et al., The Impact of Double Taxation 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data, 28 CONTEMP. ECON. 
POL’Y 366 (2010); Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential Versus 
Performance, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 775 (2004); and Paul L. Baker, An Analysis of Double Taxation 
Treaties and Their Effect on Foreign Direct Investment, 21 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 341 (2014). 
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resolving disputes between the taxpayer and taxing authorities, then levels of cross-
border investment should increase between two countries following adoption of a 
bilateral tax treaty. These studies fall into two general groups. The first type focuses on 
individual countries and measures changes in cross-border investment following treaty 
adoptions; the second type uses cross-country comparisons to examine whether countries 
with more extensive treaty networks have higher levels of foreign direct investment.73 
The general consensus is that empirical evidence is mixed as to whether treaties lead to 
greater investment,74 with some studies finding stronger effects for middle-income 
countries than low-income countries,75 and later studies finding positive effects through 
the use of more comprehensive bilateral investment data. 76   
 
The inconclusive findings are perhaps not surprising given two types of limitations. First, 
it is hard to isolate the tax treaty effect on investment from other endogenous factors that 
influence either changes in the number of treaties or the level of investment. Second, 
these studies consider the binary question of whether or not countries entered into tax 
treaties; they do not consider the actual terms of the tax treaties. This is not surprising: 
only recently has information become available about the heterogeneity of tax treaty 
provisions.77  
 
In addition to the IBFD studies, the ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset constructed by 
Martin Hearson and other researchers at the International Center for Tax and 
Development provides valuable information on treaty provisions of developing 
countries.78 These scholars reviewed 519 tax treaties from developing countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia focusing primarily on treaty provisions covering PE status, 
withholding rates, and taxation of capital gains of non-residents. The dataset enabled 
them to determine regional differences in the level of source-based taxation provided in 
                                                 
73 DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 1 at 108-09. 
74 IMF, Spillovers, supra note 3; DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 1; Michael Lang & 
Jeffrey Owens, supra note 20. 
75 Neumayer, supra note 72. 
76 Hearson, Corporate Tax Base, supra note 38 at 236 and Barthel et al. supra note 72. 
77 Wijnen & de Goede, The UN Model in Practice 1997–2013, supra note 47.  
78 Martin Hearson, Measuring Tax Treaty Negotiation Outcomes: The ActionAid Tax Treaty Dataset (ICTD 
Working Paper 47, 2016). 
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treaties as well as to isolate differences in treaties between developing countries and in 
treaties between developed and developing countries. They found that while developing 
countries have, on average, given up greater taxing rights because of falling withholding 
rates, the PE provisions over time have become more source-based (with no clear pattern 
found with respect to taxing capital gains and other types of income).  This variation 
among treaties should allow scholars to more effectively isolate the relationship between 
different types of favorable treaty provisions and increased foreign investment. 
 
But even with better information about the benefits of tax treaties from increased foreign 
investment, challenges still exist when it comes to estimating the revenue lost through 
treaty provisions that deprive the source country of taxing jurisdiction. While the 
ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset is helpful in identifying treaty provisions that result in 
revenue losses, this is only part of the story. In order to estimate revenue lost because of 
treaty provisions, we would still need to know the domestic tax provisions that would 
apply in the absence of a treaty. For example, because many countries in their domestic 
tax law adopt the PE standard for taxing business activity, the revenue losses from 
business activity conducted without a PE would be the same whether or not a treaty 
existed. In addition, revenue estimates would need to reflect a country’s administrative 
capacity to combat tax-minimization strategies that result in MNEs shifting income to 
other jurisdictions.  
 
While there are several country-specific studies that highlight lost revenue from treaty 
abuses or from high-profile foreign investors who generated great profits but paid little in 
taxes,79 less attention has been directed at estimating the revenue costs resulting from tax 
treaties. A Dutch not-for-profit research group, Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale 
Ondernemingen (SOMO or in English, Centre for Research on Multinational 
Organizations), has compiled some of the best estimates of lost tax revenue from tax 
                                                 
79 ACTIONAID, MISTREATED: THE TAX TREATIES THAT ARE DEPRIVING THE WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES 
OF VITAL REVENUE (2016), http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/actionaid_-
_mistreated_tax_treaties_report_-_feb_2016.pdf. 
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treaties.80 The SOMO study focuses on the withholding tax provisions for dividends and 
interest for treaties between the Netherlands and several developing countries. Two 
factors make this study extremely useful: first, the Netherlands is a key jurisdiction for 
conduit structures that facilitate treaty shopping; and second, the Dutch Central Statistics 
Bureau collects information on interest and dividends income received by Netherland 
corporations, including “special financial institutions” (conduit or mailbox companies). 
Using this data, SOMO was able to calculate lost tax revenue for 29 developing countries 
by comparing the differences between withholding tax rates that apply with and without 
treaties to interest and dividends received by special financial institutions.  The biggest 
loser was Venezuela, but Mexico, Indonesia, Argentina, Ukraine, and the Philippines also 
suffer substantial revenue losses. While this study uses several assumptions in making the 
calculations (such as no change in investments levels from the existence of a tax treaty 
and the choice of method for allocating foreign investment holdings to special financial 
institutions) and considers only lost revenue from lower withholding rates on dividends 
and interest (and not revenue losses from lower withholding taxes on royalties and losses 
from transfer-pricing strategies), it highlights the negative impact treaties have on raising 
tax revenue. 
 
Viewing tax treaties as partly or largely tax incentives also has the advantage of using the 
existing approaches developed for determining the costs and benefits of various types of 
tax incentives (such as tax holidays, reduced corporate tax rates, and favorable 
depreciation regimes). These exercises highlight the information and assumptions 
required to make assessments as well as the different types of models policymakers could 
use. For example, in order for policymakers to determine the increase in incremental 
foreign investments from traditional tax incentives or tax treaties, they must estimate the 
projected additions to existing capital stock decreased by the amount of investment that 
would have been made in the absence of a tax treaty (the “non-treaty related foreign 
investments” from Part I.A, also known as the “redundancy” ratio), as well as the impact 
on the level of local investment (any “crowding out” effect). The infra-marginal effects 
                                                 
80 Katrin McGauran, Should the Netherlands Sign Tax Treaties with Developing Countries (Centre for 
Research on Multinational Organizations, 2013). 
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would be the lost tax revenue from treaty benefits accruing to existing and non-treaty 
related foreign investment. The marginal effects would be the level of increased foreign 
investment attributable to the tax treaty. The exercises also require estimating the direct 
impact of the investment (for example, increase in number of jobs), indirect impacts 
related to economic activities triggered by the foreign investment (spillover effects to 
suppliers and related to productivity increases from new technologies and skills), and 
induced impact (the multiplier effect of the spending of the income generated by the 
increased economic activities).81   
 
Countries can use different tools to estimate the costs and benefits from favorable tax 
provisions, whether the incentives are provided directly to taxpayers through traditional 
tax incentives or through the use of treaty benefits. These models include traditional cost-
benefit analysis, tax expenditure assessments, corporate micro simulation models, and 
effective tax rate models.82 The choice among these alternatives depends on the questions 
being raised, data availability, and the developing country’s capacity to work with these 
models. At least for these purposes, studies that focus on individual countries and either 
predict or measure changes in investment flows following treaty adoptions are more 
useful than cross-country comparisons examining the relationship between treaty policy 
and level of foreign direct investment. 
   
The major point is that deciding whether developing countries should enter into treaties 
with developed countries requires country-specific and treaty-specific determinations 
(including provision-by-provision determinations) of the costs and benefits from treaty 
adoption.  As the relative costs and benefits will differ by country, developing countries 
will likely reach different conclusions about the desirability of tax treaties with developed 
                                                 
81 See Duanjie Chen, The Framework for Assessing Tax Incentives: A Cost-Benefit Approach Analysis 
(2015), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015TIBP_PaperChen.pdf, 
82 A joint paper by the IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank for the G-20 Development Working Group provides 
an excellent overview of different models for estimating costs and benefits of tax incentives,  OECD, 
Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives: Background Document: 
Tools for the Assessment of Tax Incentives (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/options-for-low-
income-countries-effective-and-efficient-use-of-tax-incentives-for-investment-background-document.pdf. 
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countries, and, even within a particular country, reach different conclusions about treaties 
with different treaty partners.  
 
 
III. BEPS Project and Observations 
 
A. Does the BEPS Project Change the Calculus? 
 
Although the primary focus of the BEPS project was on preserving the tax base in 
developed countries, developing countries will also benefit from many of the proposed 
recommendations and changes resulting from these efforts.83 The recommendations of 
the BEPS project can be grouped into four categories: changes in domestic legislation; 
changes to treaties; changes to the OECD transfer-pricing guidelines; and actions with 
respect to transparency and exchange of information.84 
 
For many countries, the BEPS project provides an excellent opportunity to improve the 
domestic legislation governing cross-border transactions. At least for the next couple of 
years, tax authorities have political cover and support from international organizations in 
adopting a more robust international tax regime, which includes more effective controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC) rules, interest-stripping limitations, and general anti-abuse 
rules. Although many of the specific BEPS recommendations fit some developing 
countries better than others, the opportunity to adopt rules to limit many types of 
aggressive tax strategies is too good to pass up. 
 
Similarly, many of the proposed treaty changes will benefit developing countries. For 
example, the proposed changes in the OECD model convention and commentary that 
                                                 
83 For an excellent summary of the BEPS project from a developing country perspective, see Hugh J. Ault & 
Brian J. Arnold, Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview, in UNITED NATIONS 
HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 1 (2d ed. 
2017). 
84 Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS – Lessons for Coordination (Aug. 2, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985752).   
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address the artificial avoidance of PE status will increase source-based taxation, although 
the changes reflect the tightening of the rules rather than any fundamental changes in the 
scope of PE status.85 Developing countries will also benefit from adopting provisions that 
provide a higher level of protection against treaty shopping than exists in many current 
treaties. Although some developing countries may find it advantageous to adopt some 
version of the limitation-of-benefits article, the general anti-abuse rule based on a 
“principal purposes” test would provide greater protection against abusive transactions 
than current treaty provisions do.  
 
The minimum standard and the set of best practices, set forth in BEPS Action 14 related to 
the resolution of treaty-related disputes under the mutual agreement procedure provide 
developing countries with a potentially more effective mechanism for resolving disputes 
with foreign investors than current alternatives.86 Even without an acceptance of 
mandatory arbitration, a country’s commitment to act responsibly in resolving treaty 
disputes is an important development. With more anti-abuse standards and new 
legislation to combat profit shifting and base-erosion, the BEPS project will likely result in 
more, rather than fewer, disputes between taxpayers and taxing authorities. If countries 
seek to provide greater tax certainty to foreign investors in order to increase foreign 
investment, then providing for the resolution of treaty-related disputes under an effective 
mutual agreement procedure is an attractive option.  
 
Finally, the multilateral instrument may also prove to be a useful tool for developing 
countries to address some unfavorable provisions in existing tax treaties—for example, 
by providing a cost-effective and timely way of modifying existing tax treaties and 
providing some opportunity to compensate and correct for prior mistakes. The process of 
deciding whether to make reservations with respect to certain provisions of the 
multilateral instrument gives countries an opportunity to highlight changes in their treaty 
policies.  
 
                                                 
85 Adolfo Martín Jimenéz, supra note 3. 
86 OECD, BEPS Action 14 Final Report: Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective (2015). 
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The BEPS project’s actions on transfer-pricing methods and documentation likely have 
both positive and negative implications for many developing countries. In a UN survey on 
the relative importance of different BEPS action items, many developing countries 
identified transfer pricing as the major cause of base erosion in their country.87 On the 
positive side, providing tax authorities with information from standardized transfer-
pricing documentation, especially country-by-country reporting, will both constrain 
taxpayer behavior in adopting inconsistent positions across tax jurisdictions and enable 
tax authorities to better identify aggressive pricing strategies. Developing countries will 
vary greatly in their administrative capacity to take advantage of the additional 
information and in their ability to secure agreements with developing countries to obtain 
the information. 
 
Although the movement toward the greater use of profit-split methodologies may result 
in more tax revenue for developing countries,88 some, but not all, developing countries 
might have been better served if the BEPS project had considered the feasibility of a 
formulary approach to transfer pricing.89 While toolkits are useful to help developing 
countries apply transfer-pricing rules where data concerning comparable uncontrolled 
prices are lacking,90 other approaches to transfer pricing that better reflect where value is 
created and that better fit the administrative capacities of many developing countries 
merit serious consideration. 
 
The BEPS project will probably result in little change to the fundamental allocation of 
taxing rights among countries. 91 Although one of the objectives of the BEPS project was 
                                                 
87 Carmel Peters, Developing Countries’ Reactions to the G20/OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, 69 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 375 (2015). 
88 This assumes that the countries can agree on a profit-splitting methodology and on when the 
methodology should apply. OECD, BEPS Action 10: Revised Guidance on Profit Splits (2017). 
89 Alex Cobham & Simon Loretz, International Distribution of the Corporate Tax Base: Implications of 
Different Apportionment Factors under Unitary Taxation (ICTD Working Paper 27, 2014). 
90 IMF, et al., A Toolkit for Addressing Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing 
Analyses (Platform for Collaboration on Tax, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/toolkit-on-comparability-and-
mineral-pricing.pdf. 
91 The BEPS project action plan specifically notes that it is “not directly aimed at changing the existing 
international standards on the allocation of taxing rights on cross-border income.” OECD, Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting 11 (2013). 
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to increase source-based taxation by better aligning taxing rights and value creation, it is 
uncertain whether the gains will be substantial. The BEPS project avoided opportunities to 
address the challenges of taxing the digital economy, to reevaluate the PE standard, and to 
consider fundamental changes to the transfer-pricing rules. Although any fundamental 
reform will result in winners and losers among both developed and developing countries, 
it is likely that reforms in any of these three areas would result in greater source-based 
taxation, to the benefit of many developing countries.  
 
But despite the BEPS project’s failure to address these challenges, developing countries, in 
many but not all ways, have ended up as unintended beneficiaries of the project. The BEPS 
project will likely curtail the most aggressive tax-avoidance strategies by MNEs, 
particularly with respect to the use of intermediaries to siphon off profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions. The BEPS project also increased awareness of how countries use their tax 
systems to aid their MNEs, often at the expense of tax revenues for source countries. 
Finally, even where the BEPS project failed to act, the unilateral actions of countries (such 
as the United Kingdom, Australia, India, and the US), in devising their own rules to 
increase source-based taxation, provide a template for developing countries to craft their 
own provisions that could be tailored to country-specific tax environments. Because we 
are still at the early stages in implementing the BEPS project recommendations, it remains 
unclear how the BEPS project will influence the ability of developing countries to tax 
cross-border transactions and the desirability of tax treaties with developed countries. 
 
 
B. Observations Going Forward on the Desirability of Tax Treaties 
 
Whether the BEPS project has changed the calculus about whether developing countries 
should enter into treaties with developed countries remains uncertain. It is uncertain 
partly because it is difficult to determine the BEPS counterfactual—that is, what the 
international tax regime would have looked like without the BEPS project. The BEPS 
project could be viewed as part of the continued movement towards greater source-based 
taxation and increased awareness of the tax avoidance schemes of MNEs. While many of 
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the BEPS action items were under serious consideration by the OECD before the BEPS 
initiative, the BEPS project accelerated progress on these items and increased the 
likelihood of their successful completion. The momentum for greater source-based 
taxation would likely have existed even without the BEPS project.  
 
It is important to appreciate that this movement toward greater source-based taxation 
does not reflect a heightened concern on the part of developed countries about tax 
revenue potentially lost by developing countries because of treaty provisions. Rather, it 
reflects an alignment of interests between many developed countries and developing 
countries concerning the mismatch between profits earned in the source country and the 
amount of tax revenue actually collected.  
 
This mismatch will generate support in both developed and developing countries for 
increased source-based taxation through such measures as an expanded view of activities 
that are deemed to be a PE, nexus requirements with respect to the digital economy, 
equalization taxes on designated activities, as well as taxes on diverted profits and 
surtaxes on base-erosion payments. It could also provide momentum for fundamental 
international tax changes that move beyond the simple dichotomy of source and 
residence. These could include proposals for global apportionment or a destination-based 
cash flow tax. Given the great diversity among developing countries, any fundamental 
change would generate tax winners and losers as compared to the current international 
tax regime. 
 
While the traditional focus has been on whether developing countries should enter into 
tax treaties with developed countries, the better questions may be what form the treaties 
should take and with whom developing countries should enter into treaties. For many 
countries, it is likely better not to enter into treaties unless they can secure meaningful 
withholding rates and safeguards against treaty abuse. 
 
Developing countries could also be more selective in choosing new treaty partners and 
more aggressive in deciding whether to terminate or amend existing treaties (especially 
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with countries that are obviously acting as conduits for foreign investors). Where 
administrative resources are limited, countries should identify the four or five countries 
that represent the bulk of in-bound investment rather than try to establish a large treaty 
network. By focusing on only a few high-value treaties, countries can conduct the 
necessary economic analysis to get some estimate of both the revenue costs of specific 
treaty provisions and the potential benefits of increased economic activity. Developing 
countries could also review their existing treaties to identify those treaties that facilitate 
substantial tax revenue losses.   
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
For some, perhaps many, developing countries, it makes little economic sense to enter 
into tax treaties with developed countries. The game is not worth the candle. The 
potential tax revenues lost under either OECD or UN-type tax treaties do not justify the 
gains from increased foreign investment and the other treaty benefits (such as information 
exchanges with other countries and assistance in collection of taxes). 
 
But for many other developing countries, the calculus is more complex. Here are three 
reasons. First, the stylized world where tax revenue yielded by source countries is picked 
up by residence countries is more fiction than fact. The amount of tax revenue collected 
by developed countries for income earned in developing countries is likely relatively 
small. This results either from deliberate decisions made by developed countries to 
minimize the tax burden on foreign source income to make their MNEs more competitive 
in the global arena (either through domestic legislation, regulations, or through treaty 
terms) or from the MNEs using a host of tax-minimization strategies to move income to 
low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. Likewise, the amount of revenue foregone by developing 
countries due to tax treaties (even those with source-friendly and pro-developing country 
provisions) may be decreased because of challenges in collecting taxes due to policy or 
administrative constraints or the use of tax incentives. If foreign investors can capture 
treaty benefits, then it is certainly plausible that treaties increase the amount of foreign 
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investment into a country by lowering the pre-tax return for the investment, either by 
reducing the level of aggregate tax liability or by reducing the risk premium associated 
with an investment due to uncertainties related to tax policy and tax administration.      
 
Second, developing countries vary greatly by economic objectives and characteristics, 
political choices, and administrative capacity. Some developing countries have a large 
stock of existing foreign investment and country-specific advantages that make foreign 
investment attractive even without treaty benefits (such that the countries would incur 
substantial infra-marginal costs from treaty adoptions). In contrast, other countries may 
find that tax treaties are an attractive vehicle to attract more mobile investments. The 
simple model of developing countries as primarily or solely capital importers no longer 
rings true. Differences in the countries’ tax rules governing cross-border activity and tax 
administrative capacity means that some countries may lose little tax revenue by yielding 
taxing rights, while the revenue losses in other countries may be much greater. Blanket 
conclusions about the desirability of tax treaties between developed and developing 
countries are of limited utility.    
 
Finally, it is likely helpful to view tax treaties more as instruments of pursing economic 
objectives and less as negotiations between countries over splitting tax revenue from 
cross-border activity. Viewing tax treaties as tax incentives changes the focus to whether 
this type of incentive generates economic benefits that justify the revenue costs and 
whether tax treaties (as opposed to other forms of tax incentives) are the right tool for the 
job. 
 
Where does this take us? Countries (both developed and developing) need to do the hard 
work of estimating the economic consequences of entering into tax treaties. This country-
specific and treaty-specific cost-benefit exercise will be challenging and frustrating, 
given the many different assumptions that will influence the calculations. But these 
challenges are similar to those for estimating the costs and benefits of tax incentives and 
other types of tax expenditures. The exercise will also inform a country’s negotiating 
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positions by highlighting those provisions (such as zero or low withholding taxes) that 
contribute to potential revenue losses.  
 
Developing countries can continue to search for ways to increase source-based taxation if 
they determine that it is in their self-interest, whether through unilateral, bilateral or 
multilateral avenues. The recent actions of the United Kingdom, Australia, India and the 
US as well as recent EU proposals on taxing the digital economy provide interesting 
approaches that developing countries could imitate and perhaps improve. Another 
potentially promising alternative is greater use of withholding taxes on business activity 
in the country either related to provision of technical services by providers without a PE in 
the country (UN Article 12A) or, even more broadly, through a withholding tax on any 
business activity above a certain threshold where the provider of goods and services does 
not have a PE. Developing countries also have strong incentives to continue to work with 
the UN or other regional groups to increase source-based taxation in treaties or to 
renegotiate terms of existing treaties, particularly where countries have signaled a 
willingness to provide for terms more favorable to developing countries. 
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